黄宗博：The Risk of Implicit Guarantees: Evidence from Shadow Banks in China
【时间】 2019年12月23日12:30-14:00
【地点】 永利集团3044am官方入口305会议室
【主讲人】 黄宗博 助理教授
【主持人】 高明 副教授
【报告摘要】Although implicit guarantees are widely used in the shadow banking system, we know very little about its qualitative and quantitative properties. In this paper, we use a micro-level data set on China's shadow bank products to quantify the risk of implicit guarantees. We find a robust empirical fact that a bank extends stronger implicit guarantees to its shadow bank debt (i.e., wealth management products) when its reputation deteriorates. A simple model based on a stylized signaling game is proposed to rationalize the fact. The key mechanism of the model is that as a bank's reputation becomes worse, it has stronger incentives to send positive signals to the market, i.e., to boost the realized returns of its shadow bank debt, although it is not obliged to do so. Our findings imply that riskier banks should have higher risk-weight for their off-balance-sheet exposure because they are more tempted to offer implicit guarantees and take losses for its off-balance-sheet operations.
【主讲人介绍】
黄宗博博士于2017年加入香港中文大学（深圳），现任金融学助理教授。他本科毕业于复旦大学，于普林斯顿大学获得经济学博士学位。他的研究集中在公司金融和宏观金融，尤侧重于金融摩擦的对于实体经济的影响。
