Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement
讲座时间：12月11日12:30-14:00
讲座地点：永利集团3044am官方入口储吉旺报告厅
主讲人：刘承芳 长聘副教授
主持人：高明 副教授
报告摘要：
We present results of a randomized trial testing alternative approaches of mapping student achievement into rewards for teachers. Teachers in 216 schools in western China were assigned to performance pay schemes where teacher performance was assessed by one of three different methods. We find that teachers offered “pay-for-percentile” incentives outperform teachers offered simpler schemes based on class average achievement or average gains over a school year. Moreover, pay-for-percentile incentives produced broad-based gains across students within classes. That teachers respond to relatively intricate features of incentive schemes highlights the importance of paying close attention to performance pay design.
刘承芳，女，侗族，北京大学现代农学院长聘副教授、博士生导师；北京大学中国农业政策研究中心研究员。2008年获美国加州大学（戴维斯）农业与资源经济学博士学位，毕业后主要从事农业与农村发展研究。主持国家自然科学基金的国际合作重点、面上项目以及3IE等国际合作项目。迄今在国内外公开发表学术论文100余篇（包括发表在Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Labor Economics等本领域的重要刊物）。2019年入选“国家杰青”，同年当选美国农业与应用经济学会（AAEA）中国分会主席。
