题 目：On the Paradox of Mediocracy（中庸悖论）
时 间：2019年11月28日（周四）10：30—12：00
地 点：永利集团3044am官方入口303会议室
主讲人：乔雪 （清华大学）
组织人：胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇、汪浩、胡岠
摘 要：We consider a two-agent hierarchical organization with a leader and a manager in a reputation-signaling model. The manager proposes an innovative but risky project to the leader, and decides whether to exert an effort to improve the value of the project, which benets the organization. The leader decides whether to endorse the project or block it. The leader's competence is her private information, and the market updates its belief about the leader's type based on observation of her action (endorsing the project or blocking it) and its outcome. In equilibrium, the leader could behave
excessively conservatively when she is subject to reputation concerns. We have two main findings. First, aside from its usual distortionary effects, the leader's reputation concern has a benecial effect by inducing the manager to supply productive effort and improves the organization's performance. Second, there exists a nonmonotonic relationship between the perceived competence of the leader and the performance of the organization. As a result, a paradox of mediocracy emerges: The organization may benet from a seemingly mediocre leader, as a mediocre leader motivates the manager to exert effort, which offsets the efficiency loss due to incorrect decisions.
主讲人介绍： 乔雪为清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授(on leave)，清华大学中国经济研究中心研究员。她于1998年获得北京大学经济学学士学位，于2007年获得美国爱荷华州立大学经济学博士学位。她的研究领域主要包括宏观经济学，中国经济，以及政治经济学。她主持国家自科基金面上项目和青年项目，在Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Macroeconomic Dynamics, Journal of Comparative Economics等国际英文期刊和《经济研究》、《金融研究》、《世界经济》、《经济学季刊》等国内中文期刊上发表论文。
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