题 目：Governing Adaptation and Coordination: A Generalization of Multi-agent Delegation（权衡适应与共谋：多代理人情形的推广）
时 间：2019年10月31日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：永利集团3044am官方入口303会议室
主讲人：翁翕 （北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系教授）
主持人：胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇、汪浩、胡岠
摘 要：This paper uses a mechanism design without transfer approach to investigate the optimal communication mechanism in a two-division organization. The principal, with perfect commitment power on multiple decision rules, wants decisions to be both adapted to local conditions and coordinated with each other. Agents are privately informed about local conditions and only care about adaptation loss. We explicitly characterize the essentially unique optimal dominant strategy mechanism with weak continuity restriction in this framework.
The optimal mechanism takes the form of "delegation with autonomous constraint", where each agent is granted a delegation interval contingent on the other's report. The optimal design of these intervals is elegantly decomposed into two single agent's unilateral coordination problems. An agent's decision in the optimal mechanism falls into three cases: i) full adaptation; ii) the state-dependent unilateral coordination; and iii) the state-independent joint coordination. This special structure makes the optimal mechanism group strategyproof, and allows us to conduct multiple comparative static analyses with respect to delegated discretion.
主讲人介绍：翁翕，现为北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系教授，“日出东方”光华研究学者。目前主要研究领域为博弈论，应用微观经济理论和产业经济学。本科、硕士均毕业于北京大学，博士毕业于美国宾夕法尼亚大学。研究成果发表或即将发表于国外顶级学术期刊，如Journal of Finance, Management Science, Economic Journal, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Economic Theory (两篇), International Economic Review (两篇), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 和Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.主持国家自然科学基金面上项目“组织经济学理论与应用”。曾获奖项有：2017中国信息经济学青年创新奖，2017北京大学教学优秀奖，2017第十三届北京大学人文社会科学研究优秀成果一等奖，2016北京大学北京银行奖教金，2016中国信息经济学乌家培奖，2015及2016台新金控最佳研究新人奖，2011 David Cass Memorial Prize in Economics, 2010 CES Gregory Chow Best Paper Awards.
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