北大经院工作坊第864场
History's Masters: The Effect of European Monarchs on State Performance
经济史工作坊
主讲人：Sebastian Ottinger（Assistant Professor at CERGE-EI）
主持老师：（北大经院）赵一泠、Mark Hup
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色、李波
时间：2024年4月25日（周四）10：00-11：30（北京时间）
形式：腾讯会议
会议号：977-621-409
主讲人简介：
Sebastian is an Assistant Professor (tenure-track) at CERGE-EI in Prague (a joint workplace of Charles University and the Czech Academy of Sciences). He graduated from UCLA Anderson School of Management in 2021, was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Northwestern University's Center for Economic History from 2021 to 2022, and visited Harvard's Department of Economics in Fall 2019. He is an Applied Microeconomist with research projects in the fields of Urban Economics and Political Economy, all drawing on European or American Economic History.
摘要：
We create a novel reign-level dataset for European monarchs, covering all major European states between the 10th and 18th centuries. We first document a strong positive relationship between rulers’ cognitive ability and state performance. To address endogeneity issues, we exploit the facts that i) rulers were appointed according to hereditary succession, independent of their ability, and ii) the wide-spread inbreeding among the ruling dynasties of Europe led over centuries to quasi-random variation in ruler ability. We code the degree of blood relationship between the parents of rulers, which also reflects ‘hidden’ layers of inbreeding from previous generations. The ‘coefficient of inbreeding’ is a strong predictor of ruler ability, and the corresponding instrumental variable results imply that ruler ability had a sizeable effect on the performance of states and their borders. This supports the view that ‘leaders made history,’ shaping the European map until its consolidation into nation states. We also show that rulers mattered only where their power was largely unconstrained. In reigns where parliaments checked the power of monarchs, ruler ability no longer affected their state’s performance.
北大经院工作坊第865场
中国特色全要素生产率
政治经济学工作坊
主讲人：范欣（中国人民大学全国中国特色社会主义政治经济学研究中心副主任）
主持老师：（北大经院）张辉、方敏
时间：2024年4月25日（周四）15：00-17：00
地点：北京大学文史楼114教室
主讲人简介：
范欣，中国人民大学永利集团3044am官方入口副教授、博士生导师，中国人民大学全国中国特色社会主义政治经济学研究中心副主任、研究员，吴玉章青年学者，研究方向是中国特色社会主义政治经济学、市场分割、数字经济等领域。近年来，主持国家社会科学基金一般项目、国家自然科学基金青年项目等10余项，先后在《中国社会科学（中英文版）》《经济研究》《管理世界》以及Land Use Policy、Journal of Happiness Studies等国内外知名学术期刊上发表论文40余篇，多篇论文被《新华文摘》等期刊全文转载。相关成果曾获国家级教学成果奖一等奖、北京市哲学社会科学优秀成果奖二等奖、兴华优秀论文奖等多项奖项。所撰写的咨询报告多次获得国家级或省部级领导人肯定性批示。
摘要：
面对新一轮科技革命和产业变革深入发展、后疫情时代经济下行风险加大、经济发展方式亟需转变等多重因素叠加，新质生产力被正式提出，而新质生产力的核心标志是大幅提升全要素生产率。全要素生产率虽是西方主流经济学的常见概念，但从思想缘起看，马克思关于提高劳动生产率的认识中蕴含着全要素生产率思想。作为社会化生产条件下劳动生产率的重要内容，全要素生产率进一步体现在两种含义的 “社会必要劳动时间”范畴上。从马克思主义政治经济学视角重新审视全要素生产率，并将其纳入中国特色社会主义政治经济学理论体系之中，是中国特色社会主义政治经济学 “不忘本来、吸收外来、面向未来”的生动写照。实践层面，经济长期高速发展带来生产方式变迁，基于新古典增长理论的传统增长核算不再适用于中国全要素生产率的实践检验，有必要从马克思的生产劳动理论出发，明确生产劳动所涉部门，由此测算得出的全要素生产率及其变动情况更具针对性。立足新时代新征程，作为实现我国经济高质量发展的关键抓手，着力提高全要素生产率需平衡好长期与短期、供给与需求、总量与结构等多个方面，在供需协调发展中推动经济发展质量变革、效率变革和动力变革，加快发展新质生产力。
北大经院工作坊第866场
The Productivity of Professions: Evidence from the Emergency Department
发展与公共财政工作坊
主讲人：Yiqun Chen （University of Illinois at Chicago）
主持老师：
（北大经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇
（北大国发院）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健
时间：2024年4月26日（周五）11:30-13:00
地点：北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园345教室
主讲人简介：
Dr. Yiqun Chen is an assistant professor of economics at the University of Illinois at Chicago and a Faculty Research Fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Dr. Chen's research focuses on topics in the interaction of health economics and labor and organizational economics.
摘要：
This paper studies the productivity of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physicians, two professions performing overlapping tasks but with stark differences in background, training, and pay. Using quasi-experimental variation in patient assignment to NPs versus physicians in 44 Veterans Health Administration emergency departments, we find that, on average, NPs use more resources but achieve worse patient outcomes relative to physicians. The costs of lower productivity surpass the pay differences between the professions. However, even larger productivity variation exists within each profession, implying substantial productivity overlap between the two professions. Within professions, wages and assigned patient complexity vary only weakly with productivity.
北大经院工作坊第867场
Nested Instrumental Variables Design: Switcher Average Treatment Effect, Identification, Efficient Estimation and Generalizability
计量、金融和大数据分析工作坊
主讲人：Rui Wang, University of Washington
主持老师：（北大经院）王熙
参与老师：
（北大经院）王一鸣、王法、刘蕴霆
（北大国发院）黄卓、张俊妮、孙振庭
（北大新结构）胡博
时间：2024年4月26日（周五）10:00-11:30
形式： ZOOM会议
会议号: 896 1513 0445
密码: 295620
主讲人简介：
Dr Rui Wang is major in Biostatistics. Currently, he is working on several instrumental variables related projects. These include assessing the generalizability of instrumental variable estimates, employing instrumental variables to identify and estimate causal effects in clinical trials under complex sampling designs, and addressing challenges associated with weak instruments. He has published papers in Atherosclerosis、Vaccines and Statistics in Medicine.
摘要：
Instrumental variables (IV) are a commonly used tool to estimate causal effects from non-randomized data. A prototype of an IV is a randomized trial with non-compliance where the randomized treatment assignment serves as an IV for the non-ignorable treatment received. Under a monotonicity assumption, a valid IV non-parametrically identifies the average treatment effect among a non-identifiable complier subgroup, whose generalizability is often under debate. In many studies, there could exist multiple versions of an IV, for instance, different nudges to take the same treatment in different study sites in a multi-center clinical trial. These different versions of an IV may result in different compliance rates and offer a unique opportunity to study IV estimates’ generalizability. In this article, we introduce a novel nested IV assumption and study identification of the average treatment effect among two latent subgroups: always-compliers and switchers, who are defined based on the joint potential treatment received under two versions of a binary IV. We derive the efficient influence function for the SWitcher Average Treatment Effect (SWATE) and propose efficient estimators. We then propose formal statistical tests of the generalizability of IV estimates based on comparing the conditional average treatment effect among the always-compliers and that among the switchers under the nested IV framework. We apply the proposed framework and method to the Prostate, Lung, Colorectal and Ovarian (PLCO) Cancer Screening Trial and study the causal effect of colorectal cancer screening and its generalizability.
北大经院工作坊第868场
Responsibility Sharing in a Public Bad Experiment
行为和实验经济学工作坊
主讲人：贺思民（上海财经大学永利集团3044am官方入口常任副教授）
主持老师：（北大经院）陆方文
参与老师：
（北大经院）平新乔、秦雪征、庄晨、曹光宇
（北大光华）孟涓涓、高彧
（北大现代农学院）刘承芳、罗仁福、候玲玲、王悦
（北大教育学院）杨钋、丁延庆、马莉萍、朱琼
时间：2024年4月26日（周五）10:00-11:30
地点：永利集团3044am官方入口302会议室
主讲人简介：
贺思民，上海财经大学永利集团3044am官方入口的常任副教授，2020年获国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金资助。她的研究兴趣是行为与实验经济学，最近研究的主题包括合作与协调博弈、行为机制设计、信念更新等。她的工作发表在国际管理学与经济学权威期刊，如Management Science, Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Journal, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Games and Economic Behavior等。她曾主持国家自然科学基金青年项目（已结题，获评特优），论文获上海市哲学社会科学优秀成果一等奖。
摘要：
We propose a novel mechanism to mitigate socially undesirable behavior (e.g., pollution, corruption, tax avoidance) framed as the provision of public bads in large groups. Players first choose their social network, where having a greater number of partners brings benefits. Subsequently, they decide whether to provide a public bad that yields benefits to themselves but imposes costs on the entire society. In the event of providing the public bad, there is a small chance of being detected and subsequently punished. In our proposed responsibility-sharing mechanism, if a player is detected providing the public bad, all their partners also face punishment. Both the theoretical analysis and experimental results strongly support the effectiveness of this mechanism in inducing socially desirable outcomes. Furthermore, in an additional experimental treatment, we find that the mechanism is less effective when the undesirable behavior is private information, despite players having the option to voluntarily disclose such information.
北大经院工作坊第869场
我国PPI编制方法及统计解读
宏观经济学工作坊
主讲人：王有捐（国家统计局城市司司长）
主持老师：（北大经院）韩晗
参与老师：
（北大国发院）赵波、余昌华、李明浩
（北大经院）陈仪、李伦
时间：2024年4月26日（周五）10:00-12:00
地点：北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园132教室
主讲人简介：
王有捐，现任国家统计局城市司司长，高级统计师，北京大学公共管理硕士。曾先后担任国家统计局城市司处长、国家统计局青海调查总队副总队长、国家统计局住户办主任、国家统计局信息景气中心主任。曾从事抽样调查设计与实施、居民收支和物价调查、城市基本情况统计、经济景气监测等工作。主要参加中国-加拿大住户调查国际合作项目和国内外多个大型研究课题。主要研究领域为收入分配、城乡贫困、农民工就业和价格趋势变化等。合作编著了《城镇贫困—中国发展的新挑战》、《中国收入分配统计问题研究》、《农民工在城市的就业、收入与公共服务》、《经济分析与统计解读》、《中国重点经济领域统计分析》等多本书籍。
摘要：
本次讲座分四个部分，将分别介绍PPI概念及作用、我国PPI编制工作、2024年以来PPI统计解读和未来发展方向。
北大经院工作坊第870场
We hear you: public complaints and environmental enforcement
生态、环境与气候变化经济学工作坊
主讲人：刘梦迪（对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院副教授）
时间：2024年4月26日（周五）10:00-12:00
地点： 北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园249教室
主讲人简介：
刘梦迪，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院副教授，博士生导师。分别于2014年和2019年在南京大学获得学士学位和博士学位，并在亚利桑那大学接受博士联合培养。刘梦迪博士长期从事环境治理与政策分析相关研究。主持国家自然科学基金青年项目和面上项目。研究成果发表于American Economic Review、American Journal of Political Science、Journal of Development Economics、Journal of Policy Analysis and Management、Journal of Environmental Economics and Management等高水平期刊。研究获得美国政治科学协会Evan Ringquist最佳论文奖。
摘要：
Environmental complaints by the public are a low-cost source of information and a potential means by which local officials can improve the local environment through the identification of illegal polluting activity. However, responding to complaints may divert limited resources from other enforcement activities. This paper investigates the impact of environmental complaints on the allocation and intensity of on-site inspections on the environmental governance of Jiangsu province which is one of the more heavily industrialized provinces in China. Estimating a Local Projection estimator, we find that complaints trigger an immediate and sustained response from the regulator, increasing the probability of an inspection by about 15% in the month of the complaint and continuing to increase over the following two months. Complaints do not significantly reduce the number of other types of inspections and may even increase the number of unplanned inspections, thereby increasing overall regulatory intensity. Complaints also increase the probability of regulators subsequently detecting environmental violations. Our study suggests that encouraging public complaints act as a bottom-up approach to regulation that can effectively complement the existing inspection system.
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：薏米
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
